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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a situation where you have been pulled over by a
police officer. The police officer thinks you may have been drinking
and asks you to perform some field sobriety tests. You fail the tests.
He then gives you a commonly used alcohol field test which comes up
negative. The officer prompts you to go to the local hospital to have
your blood and urine tested for drugs. You agree.
At the hospital, under the watchful eye of the police officer, a
laboratory technician collects your chart and notices that the “Reasons
for Test” box indicates that the cause for these tests is “Reasonable
Suspicion/Cause.”1 Also included on the chart is a conspicuously
placed, handwritten note stating “Blood Drug Screen—Requested by

∗ J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A Government, Franklin and Marshall College. Thank you to
Professor Morris and Julia Lissner for all their help. Very special thank you to my
mother, sister, family and friends for all of their support during this process and law
school in general.
1
See United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 922 (7th Cir. 2006).
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Officer.”2 The technician takes your blood and urine samples as the
officer watches. The results come back positive for methamphetamine.
Charged with “use of a controlled substance,” your trial begins.
The police officer testifies that he saw you urinate into a cup and that
the laboratory technician took a sample of your blood for testing. The
police officer is the only person who is allowed to testify as to your
medical records; the laboratory technician that conducted the tests is
not called to testify. The results of your lab exams are admitted into
evidence under the ordinary business records exception to the hearsay
rule despite your objections.
This scenario is not fiction: it is the reality of the recent
Seventh Circuit decision, United States v. Ellis.3 In Ellis, the court
ruled that blood and urine drug screen records were not testimonial in
nature because they were records of regularly conducted activity kept
in the ordinary course of business, and thus, were not subject to the
Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.4 While the Seventh Circuit
may have produced a result that is consistent with the purpose of the
Confrontation Clause,5 it did so through flawed reasoning.6
This Note will first discuss the history and background of the
hearsay rule, its exceptions, and the Confrontation Clause. It will then
consider the issue of whether a business record prepared in
anticipation of litigation should be admitted into evidence without
giving the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.7

2

See id.
Id.
4
Id. at 927.
5
Robert L. Windon, Crawford v. Washington - How the Seventh Circuit
Improperly Defined “Testimonial,” 1 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 105 (2006), at
http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v1-1/windon.pdf. (The underlying purpose of the
Confrontation Clause is to enhance the accuracy in the fact-finding process,
therefore, it only approves of hearsay that is “marked with such trustworthiness that
there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule”).
6
Discussed further, infra.
7
“1. One who has made a statement <in accordance with the rules of evidence,
the statement was offered to prove the declarant's state of mind>. 2. One who has
3
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In addressing that issue, this Note will focus on the line of cases that
explain the evolution of the Confrontation Clause and its relationship
with the hearsay exceptions. The discussion focuses on the split within
the authorities and argues that, although the Seventh Circuit may have
reached the right decision, it did so with flawed reasoning. Finally, this
Note provides a possible solution to the split in authorities. This Note
ultimately concludes that the courts are using a sliding scale when
attempting to decide whether evidence that has been prepared in
anticipation of litigation is testimonial or nontestimonial and propose a
bright line rule for use in future cases.
I. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
John Henry Wigmore8 famously stated that “cross-examination
is ‘beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth.’”9 “This open examination of witnesses viva voce,
in the presence of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing
up of truth than the private and secret examination taken down in
writing before an officer or his clerk.”10
Wigmore’s quote, made over seven hundred years ago,
reverberates loudly to this very day as evidenced by the embodiment
of his quote’s spirit in the Constitution of the United States.11 The
Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause requires that “in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted

signed a declaration, esp. one stating an intent to become a U.S. citizen <the
declarant grew up in Italy>.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed., 2004).
8
COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2001-2005). John Henry Wigmore is a
noted American legal educator. Wigmore is most known for his work on Treatise of
Evidence and other books on Evidence. He was a professor at Northwestern
University School of Law from 1893 until 1901, when he became Dean of the Law
Faculty until 1929.
9
5 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1367, p. 32
(James H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
10
3 William Blackstone, Commentaries 373.
11
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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with the witnesses against him.”12 This basic right was modified
throughout the years as a response to such grand state trials as those of
Sir Walter Raleigh13 and Sir John Fenwick14 because “[n]othing can be
more essential than the cross examining [of] witnesses, and generally
before the triers of the facts in question.”15 Moreover, “written
evidence . . . [is] almost useless [because] it must be frequently taken
ex parte, and but very seldom leads to the proper discovery of truth.”16
The Confrontation Clause envisages personal and crossexamination where the accused “has an opportunity, not only of
testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness but of
compelling him to stand face to face”17 with his accuser while the trier
of fact has the opportunity to witness his or her character and
demeanor.18 However, the Supreme Court has recognized that it is
impossible to read the language of the Confrontation Clause literally
because doing so would require “the exclusion of any statement made
by a declarant not present at trial.”19 Thus, the Court has come to
recognize and accept that some hearsay will be admissible.20
Under Ohio v. Roberts,21 “if a court deemed a hearsay
statement to be sufficiently reliable, the Confrontation Clause usually
posed no barrier to admissibility.”22 A statement is considered reliable
12

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44-47 (2004) (Rehnquist, J.
concurring).
14
Id.
15
Id. at 49 (quoting R. Lee, Letter IV by the Federal Farmer (Oct. 15, 1787)).
16
Id.
17
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1985).
18
Id.
19
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (Brennan, J. dissenting); (while the
Court excludes some out-of-court statements under the hearsay rules, the Court has
come to recognize that other out-of-court statements should be admissible as
exceptions to the hearsay rule).
20
Id.; see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156-57 (1970).
21
448 U.S. 556 (1980).
22
Prof. Richard Friedman and Jeffrey Fisher, Spotlight on the Confrontation
Clause, available at
13
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if it fits within a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception.23 However,
“Crawford rejected this doctrine, holding that the principal focus of
the Clause is statements that are testimonial in nature.”24
The Confrontation Clause has been a source of much debate—
and court attention—throughout the years.25 One recent debate has
centered around the “complexity of reconciling the Confrontation
Clause and the hearsay rules,”26 particularly the admissibility of
laboratory reports such as blood-alcohol tests under the businessrecords exception to the hearsay rule.27 “Prior to Crawford [v.
Washington],28 many courts admitted lab reports, especially
concerning analyses of controlled substances, through the testimony of

http://www.law.umich.edu/library/spotlight/confrontationclause/confrontationclausei
ndex.htm (last visited May 1, 2007).
23
Id.
24
Id. An out-of-court statement that meets that description may not be
admitted against an accused to prove the truth of what it asserts unless the accused
has had an opportunity to cross-examine the maker of the statement and that
person— the witness—is unavailable to testify at trial.
25
See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Rehnquist, J.
concurring); Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006); United States v. Maher,
454 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004);
United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Rueda-Rivera,
396 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Gilbertson, 435 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2006); State v. Davis, 111 P.3d
844,154 Wn.2d 291 (Wash. 2005).
26
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 n.9 (1980) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
27
See Steven Yermish, Cover Story: Crawford v. Washington and Expert
Testimony: Limiting the use of Testimonial Hearsay, 30 CHAMPION 12 (2006).
28
In 2004, the Supreme Court overruled thirty years of Ohio v. Roberts when it
decided Crawford v. Washington. Crawford ruled that the only “indicium of
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution
actually prescribes: confrontation.” The Court emphasized that one should focus on
the meaning of the word testimonial, when deciding whether the evidence in
question should be subject to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. (The
interesting point being that the Court left for another day the opportunity to
thoroughly define the word testimonial). It lessened the judge’s ability to use his or
her own discretion when deciding the matter in question.
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records custodians, lab supervisors or by certification or affidavit.”29
Confrontation Clause issues were seldom addressed in these situations,
although one court did recognize that there could be “constitutional
implications of admitting such testimony.”30
II. THE HEARSAY RULES AND THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION
Hearsay is defined as “a statement (either a verbal assertion or
nonverbal assertive conduct) other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.”31 Generally, hearsay is inadmissible in a
court proceeding because it is deemed unreliable.32 Over time,
exceptions and exemptions to this general rule have been developed
because courts have recognized that certain statements can be deemed
reliable based on the fact that they are trustworthy.33 The business
records exception to the hearsay rule is one of those situations.34
To qualify as a “business record,”35 certain criteria must be
met. Specifically, a business record must be “(1) a memorandum,
report, record or data compilation . . . made at or near the time, by or
from information transmitted by a person with knowledge, and (2) the
information must have been kept in the course of a regularly
29

Yermish, supra note 27, at 12.
Id. at 13 (citing United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 80-82 (2d Cir. 1977)
(chemist’s report was inadmissible hearsay because admitting report would raise
“legitimate doubts regarding the constitutionality” of its introduction)).
31
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
32
Id.
33
See Houghtaling v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 855 (Cal. App. 1993).
34
FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
35
Id. A business record is defined as: “[A] memorandum, report, record, or
date compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses,
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it
was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report,
record or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness, or by certification.”
30
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conducted business activity.”36 Once those requirements are met, a
court may consider a document to be admissible.37
Business records, although hearsay, have come to be
recognized as reliable.38 They are created by a business on a day-today basis in an automatic (or procedural) fashion.39 This, in turn
makes it safe to conclude that the business record is not tainted or
prejudiced.40 Thus, courts will be permitted to admit business records
as evidence.41
The validity or reliability of a business record is tainted where
the record is made in anticipation of litigation.42 This type of situation
raises Confrontation Clause concerns because the record has lost its
indicium of reliability.43 There could be a motive for the declarant to
manipulate the information in order to further the investigation.44
Because “records made in anticipation of litigation do not possess the

36

Id.
Id.
38
See id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
See Yermish, supra note 27, at 13 (citing People v. Jambor, 271 Mich. App.
1, 9 (2006) (Cooper, P.J. concurring) (The evidence in question, fingerprint cards,
“are records prepared in anticipation of litigation, because their purpose was to
document the presence of particular individuals at the scene of the crime”)); People
v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.3d 393, 397 (Third Dept. 2004) (“Documents prepared for
litigation lack the indicium of reliability necessary to invoke the business records
exception to the hearsay rule”); People v. McDaniel, 670 N.W.2d 659, 661 (2003)
(hearsay exception is based on the inherent trustworthiness of business records,
which is “undermined when the records are prepared in anticipation of litigation”);
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining a business-records exception as
“[a] hearsay exception allowing business records (such as reports or memoranda) to
be admitted into evidence if they were prepared in the ordinary course of business).
If there is good reason to doubt a record's reliability (e.g., the record was prepared in
anticipation of litigation), the exception will not apply.
43
See State v. Manocchio, 497 A.2d 1 (R.I. 1985).
44
Id.
37

569
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007

7

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 6

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 2

Spring 2007

same trustworthiness of other records,”45 they should not be allowed in
as evidence.46
Since Crawford was decided, courts have begun to note that
“whether a statement was made with an eye towards prosecution, that
is, with the knowledge or for the purpose that it would be used later
for prosecution, is an important aspect of delineating between
testimonial and nontestimonial evidence.”47 Thus, it has been
suggested that a case-by-case analysis should be conducted to consider
whether a document was produced “with an eye towards
prosecution.”48
Under such a test, if it is found that an objective witness could
reasonably be led to believe that the statement would be used at a later
trial,49 the court should, at the very least, consider the fact that the
record could be testimonial evidence and prompt the State to present
its case on why the defendant should not be entitled to its Sixth
Amendment rights. This argument is supported by the fact that all
evidence should be construed in the light most favorable to the
defendant, especially in a criminal trial where the defendant’s liberty
is at stake.
With a better understanding of hearsay, the business record
rules, and the Confrontation Clause, the discussion will now turn to
how the Seventh Circuit reached its decision. Shedding light on its
reasoning begins with the Supreme Court case of Ohio v. Roberts.50

45

City of Chicago v. Old Colony Partners, L.P., 847 N.E.2d 565, 576 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2006).
46
Id.
47
United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 924 (7th Cir. 2006); see Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Rehnquist, J. concurring); State v. Crager, 164
Ohio App. 3d 816 (2005) (statements made under circumstances that would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that such statements would later be available for use
at trial also qualify as testimonial under Crawford); see also United States v.
Cromer, 389 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2004).
48
Ellis, 460 F.3d at 924.
49
Id.
50
448 U.S. 56 (1980) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
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III. OHIO V. ROBERTS
In 1980, the Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice
Blackmun, held that (1) a defendant’s “right[s] . . . to be confronted by
the witnesses against [the defendant]”51 did not bar admission, at a
criminal trial, of an unavailable witness’ statement against the
defendant if the statement bore an “adequate indicia of reliability”;52
and (2) to meet this test, evidence had to (a) “fall[] within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception”,53 or (b) “bear[] particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.”54
Roberts was on trial for having forged a check and for
possession of stolen credit cards.55 The victim’s daughter was called as
the defense’s only witness.56 The daughter testified at the preliminary
hearing; however, she did not appear at the subsequent trial despite the
fact that several subpoenas were sent to her parents’ home.57 The state
attempted to offer the transcript of her previous testimony; however,
the defense objected stating that it was a violation of the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.58 The trial court admitted the
transcript, and the Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed it.59 The
Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed, and the case was subsequently heard
by the United State Supreme Court on certiorari.60
The Court concluded that the introduction of the daughter’s
testimony did not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment because her prior
testimony “bore sufficient indicia of reliability and afforded the trier of
51

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) (Rehnquist, J. concurring)
(citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
53
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42.
54
Id.
55
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 59.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 60.
60
Id.
52
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fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior
statement.”61 Furthermore, the witness was constitutionally
unavailable for purposes of the defendant’s trial.62 The Court
summarized its conclusion by stating that whenever a hearsay
declarant is not available to be cross-examined, the Confrontation
Clause “requires a showing that he is unavailable.”63 After meeting
this burden, the statement is “admissible only if it bears adequate
indicia of reliability.”64 An adequate indicium of reliability can be
found when “evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception,”65 however, evidence that does not show “particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness”66 under Roberts, shall be excluded in all
circumstances.67
For almost thirty years, the Roberts’ “indicia of reliability”68
test was the method for determining whether evidence could be
admitted at trial without triggering the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause.69 However, the landscape changed dramatically
when the Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington in 2004.70
IV. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON
In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court
reversed almost thirty years of precedent when it concluded that “the
only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands
is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”71
61

Id. at 73 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 n. 12 (1972)).
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
63
Id. at 66.
64
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
See 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
71
Id. at 68-69 (2004) (Rehnquist, J. concurring).
62
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Crawford was on trial for assault and attempted murder.72 The
State wanted to introduce a recorded statement that the accused’s wife
had made during a police interrogation as evidence that Crawford had
attempted murder and not acted in self-defense.73 The accused’s wife
did not testify at trial because of the state’s marital privilege laws.74
The Court made note of the traditional Roberts test and concluded that
the use of the wife’s statement was a violation of the Confrontation
Clause because, “where testimonial statements are at issue, the only
indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is . .
. confrontation.”75
In concluding that Roberts must be overruled, the Crawford
majority criticized the “indicia of reliability” method as being
“unpredictable and inconsistent.”76 The Court stated that this method
confers upon a judge excessive discretion in determining which factors
are reliable and which ones are not.77 Allowing statements in simply
because a judge deems them reliable is “fundamentally at odds with
the right of confrontation.78 The Court further buttressed its conclusion
by noting that the Framers were “loath to leave too much discretion in
judicial hands.”79
The Court took the stance that the Roberts test was a departure
from the Sixth Amendment’s historical principles because it would
permit “a jury to hear evidence, untested by the adversary process,
based on a mere judicial determination of reliability.”80 Mindful of the
immense change it was about to produce, the Court warned that
“[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously
72

Id. at 40.
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 68-69.
76
Id. at 66 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (Brennan, J.
dissenting)).
77
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67.
78
Id. at 61.
79
Id. at 67.
80
Id. at 62.
73
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reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is
obviously guilty.”81
In short, the Robert’s test was one of judicial discretion which
was highly subjective and malleable.82 Under that test, a court’s
consideration of “[w]hether a statement [should be] deemed reliable
depend[ed] heavily on which factors the judge consider[ed] and how
much weight [the judge] accord[ed] each of them.”83 The Court
forcefully stated that “[t]he unpardonable vice of the Robert’s test . . .
[was] not its unpredictability, but its demonstrated capacity to admit
core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly
meant to exclude.”84 One such statement could be a document made
with an eye towards litigation that was admitted under the cloak of the
business records exception to the hearsay rule.
The Crawford court continued its discussion by declaring that
“not all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment’s core concerns.”85 It
cited examples of hearsay that is unreliable (an off-hand remark) and
hearsay that would be arguably admissible in modern times but not in
common law times (ex-parte examinations).86 However, the crux of
the argument is formulated around whether a certain type of hearsay is
considered testimonial in nature.87
The Court used Webster’s American Dictionary of the English
Language to define the word “testimonial” as “[a] solemn declaration
81

Id.
Id. at 60-61.
83
Id. at 63 (“For example, the Colorado Supreme Court held a statement to be
more reliable because its inculpation of the defendant was ‘detailed,’ . . . while the
Fourth Circuit found a statement more reliable because the portion implicating
another was ‘fleeting[.]’ . . . The Virginia Court of Appeals found a statement more
reliable because the witness was in custody and charged with a crime (thus making
the statement more obviously against her penal interest) . . ., while the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals found a statement more reliable because the witness was not in
custody and not a suspect”) (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
84
Id.
85
Id. at 51.
86
Id.
87
Id.
82
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or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact.”88 In order to explain the dictionary definition, the Court gave an
illustration of a person who bears testimony: “an accuser89 who makes
a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense
that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does
not.”90 While this example seems to present both extremes, the Court
elaborated on the dictionary definition by stating, in dicta, that the
following formulations of core classes of testimonial statements share
a common nucleus: “[1]ex parte in-court testimony or its functional
equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations
. . . or [2] similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably
expect to be used prosecutorially”91 and “[3]statements that were made
under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for later
use at trial.”92
The second and third formulations—pretrial statements that a
declarant would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially and
statements made under circumstances that would lead an objective
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for
later use at trial—are the definitions of most importance. This is
because those formulations help demonstrate that the Seventh Circuit,
although they may have reached the right decision, did so for the
wrong reasons. It is important to keep these two formulations in mind
for the discussion of the Ellis case.
When discussing how testimonial statements would affect the
many hearsay exceptions, the Court, in dictum, stated that “most of the
hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not
88

Id. at 51 (quoting 1 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
89
A person who accuses another of a crime. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th
ed. 2004).
90
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
91
Id. (quoting Br. for Pet’r at 23).
92
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (quoting Br. for National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Pet’r at 3).
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testimonial—for example, business records.”93 This statement seems
inconsistent with the Court’s earlier declarations,94 leaving lower
courts to wonder: how does one deal with hybrid business records that
were created in anticipation of litigation or that one “would reasonably
expect to be used prosecutorially”?95 If it is true that business records
are by their very nature non-testimonial, what happens when there is a
blood and alcohol test that was created for the sole purpose of
convicting an alleged criminal?96 Although, as we will see, this is still
unclear, one thing is certain: “where testimonial evidence is at issue . .
. the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required:
unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross examine.”97
V. STATE V. DAVIS AND DAVIS V. WASHINGTON
Before reaching the discussion on Ellis, there is one more set
of important cases to discuss in this evolution: State v. Davis (“Davis
I”)98 and on certiorari to the Supreme Court, Davis v. Washington
(“Davis II”).99

93

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56.
See Yermish, supra note 27, at 13 (citing People v. Grogan, 816 N.Y.S.2d 93
(2d Dept. 2006)(testimony of lab director and criminologist from medical examiner’s
office established business records exception foundation for admission of DNA
reports from rape kit); United States v. Magyari, 63 M.J. 123, 126-27 (C.A.A.F.
2006) (lab report is nontestimonial and admissible as a business record); State v.
Forte, 629 S.E.2d 137, 143 (N.C. 2006) (DNA report not prepared exclusively for
trial deemed nontestimonial); cf. Johnson v. State, 929 So.2d 4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005), rev. granted, 920 So.2d 810 (Fla. 2006); State v. Crager, 164 Ohio App. 3d
816 (2005) rev. granted 846 N.E.2d 533 (2006) (DNA analyst’s report prepared as
part of a police investigation is testimonial under Crawford, regardless of whether it
is a business record).
95
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (Rehnquist, J. concurring) (quoting Br. for Pet’r at
23).
96
See United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 2006).
97
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
98
111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005).
99
126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006).
94
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Davis I was being decided when the Crawford ruling changed
the state of the law.100 Thus, the court had to revisit its initial
conclusions to hold that whether statements made during a 911 call are
admissible hearsay depends on whether they are testimonial or nontestimonial.101 The court noted that this type of determination should
be made on a case-by-case basis and “that statements made should be
individually evaluated for admissibility in light of the confrontation
clause.”102
Davis was arrested and charged with one count of felony
violation of the provisions of a domestic no-contact order.103 This
arrest was prompted by a 911 call from the alleged victim,
McCottry.104 The State only had two witnesses: the two officers that
responded to the 911 call.105 McCottry did not testify because the State
was not able to find her at the time of the trial.106 “The only evidence
linking Davis to her injuries was the tape recording of the 911 call.”107
The defense objected, arguing that the “admission of the 911 tape
would violate Davis’s right of confrontation,”108 however, the court
admitted the tape under the ‘excited utterance’109 hearsay exception.110
The court reasoned that when someone calls 911 as part of an
ongoing emergency, he is usually not “bearing witness” to the

100

Davis I, 111 P.3d at 844.
Id.
102
Id. at 847.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 846-47.
105
Id. at 847.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (An excited utterance is defined
as “A statement about a startling event made under the stress and excitement of the
event. An excited utterance may be admissible as a hearsay exception. Fed. R. Evid.
803(2)”).
110
Davis I, 111 P.3d at 847 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)
(Brennan, J. concurring)).
101
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incident; he is simply calling out for help.111 However, one could be
“bearing witness” if he calls 911 to report a crime, and this “may
conceivably be considered testimonial.”112 The court continued that
McCottry’s call was not intended to bear witness and was simply a call
for help as part of an ongoing emergency.113
In an amicus brief it was argued that it is common knowledge
that 911 calls may be used for prosecution, making McCottry’s
statement one that would fit within the formulations of “core
classifications of testimonial hearsay listed in Crawford.”114 The court
dismissed this argument because there was no evidence whatsoever
that McCottry “had such knowledge or that it influenced her decision
to call.”115 Thus, McCottry did not seek to “bear witness” in
contemplation of legal proceedings (as implied by the third Crawford
formulation) and her phone call was arguably not considered
testimonial.116 It is important to keep this distinction in mind as well
for the Ellis discussion below.
The Washington court noted that the inquiry that Crawford
demands is “whether the ‘witness’ is testifying.”117 In order to
determine the answer to the inquiry, one considers whether the person
is “bearing witness”118 to the event or if the evidence sought to be
admitted is one of the “principal evil[s] at which the Confrontation
Clause was directed” such as the civil-law mode of criminal

111

Davis I, 111 P.3d at 850.
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (Rehnquist, J.
concurring)).
115
Davis I, 111 P.3d at 850.
116
Id. The court noted that “nonetheless, certain statements in the call could be
deemed to be testimonial to the extent they were not concerned with seeking
assistance and protection from peril. However, the information essential to the
prosecution of this case was McCottry’s initial identification of Davis as her
assailant.”
117
Id. at 850.
118
Id.
112
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procedure.119 The majority did not focus much on developing a
method for answering the Crawford inquiry, however, the dissent did.
The dissent, authored by Judge Sanders, focused on the two
definitions supra and quoted the Sixth Circuit who noted that: “[t]he
proper inquiry . . . is whether the declarant intends to bear testimony
against the accused. That intent, in turn, may be determined by
querying whether a reasonable person in the declarant’s position
would anticipate his statement being used against the accused in
investigating and prosecuting the crime.”120 The dissent criticized the
majority for focusing “on the lack of evidence that McCottry ‘knew’
her 911 call would be used to prosecute”121 and not whether a
“reasonable person in the 911 caller’s position would know that their
statement is ‘likely to be used in investigation or prosecution of a
crime.’”122
The dissent quoted noted scholar Richard D. Friedman:
“Whether a statement is deemed to be testimonial . . . depends on
whether the statement fulfills the function of prosecution testimony.
That function, in rough terms, is the transmittal of information for use
in prosecution.”123 According to the dissent, the 911 call performed
this function.124 The majority did not analyze the 911 call under this
definition, so there is no telling what they would have concluded under
that classification.125

119

Id. at 850 (noting that the Confrontation Clause was particularly weary of
the use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused).
120
Id. at 852 (quoting United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir.
2004)).
121
Davis I, 111 P.3d at 852.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 853 (quoting Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of
Testimonial,
http://www.law.umich.edu/library/spotlight/confrontationclause/otherauthorities/arti
cles/friedman/friedmandraft.pdf at 2).
124
Davis I, 111 P.3d at 853.
125
See Davis II, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006).
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The United State Supreme Court granted certiorari in June of
2006 and, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, affirmed the
Supreme Court of Washington’s holding that “the portion of the 911
conversation in which McCottry identified Davis was not testimonial
and that if other portions of the conversation were testimonial,
admitting them was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”126 Justice
Scalia recounted the history and purpose of the Confrontation Clause
and sought to reach a more structured definition of “testimonial,” at
least for the case that was presently before them:
Without attempting to produce an exhaustive
classification of all conceivable statements—or even all
conceivable statements in response to police
interrogation—as either testimonial or nontestimonial,
it suffices to decide the present cases to hold as follows:
Statement are nontestimonial when made in the course
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation
is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of
the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.127
Even though the definition deals specifically with interrogations,
particularly police interrogations,128 it is important to note that Justice
Scalia recognized that one could plausibly take this slightly more

126

Id. at 2271.
Id. at 2273-74.
128
Id. at 2273 n.1. Justice Scalia noted that “our holding refers to
interrogations because, as explained below, the statements in the cases presently
before us are the products of interrogations—which in some circumstances tend to
generate testimonial responses. This is not to imply, however, that statements made
in the absence of any interrogation are necessarily non testimonial.
127
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structured definition of testimonial and apply it to other
circumstances.129
The above historical explanation has set forth the backdrop
under which the Seventh Circuit reached its decision in the 2006 case
of United States v. Ellis.130
VI. UNITED STATES V. ELLIS
A. The Facts
On August 22, 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit decided the matter of United States v. Ellis.131 A three judge
panel led by Judge Kanne ruled that “because the statements of
medical personnel ‘were made in the ordinary course of business,
[they] are statements that by their nature were not testimonial’ and
their admission, therefore, does not violate the Sixth Amendment.”132
Brian K. Ellis was pulled over by a police officer in Indiana.133
He failed some initial sobriety tests, but the field alcohol test came up
negative.134 “With the officer’s prompting, Ellis agreed to go to a
hospital to have his blood and urine tested for drugs.”135 Ellis was
placed in custody and escorted to the hospital by the officers.136
At trial, the police officer testified that he witnessed the lab
technician draw Ellis’s blood and watched Ellis urinate into a cup.137
“He also testified that the results of the urine test were positive for

129

Id.
460 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 2006).
131
Id.
132
New Jersey v. Renshaw, 915 A.2d 1081, 1087 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2007) (citing Ellis, 460 F.3d at 927).
133
Ellis, 460 F.3d at 921.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 922.
130
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methamphetamine.”138 The medical records were sought to be
introduced under the ordinary business records exception in order to
prove that Ellis was a controlled substance user.139 Authentication of
the medical records was established by a certificate of authenticity
performed by a laboratory technician, in compliance with Federal Rule
of Evidence 902(11).140 The exhibit admitted at trial contained two
forms filled out at the local hospital that indicated that the “collector”
of the samples was a woman named Kristy.141 The forms had a
preprinted “Reason[s] for Test” box that indicated that the reason for
Ellis’s test was “Reasonable Suspicion/Cause.”142 “Furthermore, in the
section of one of the forms indicating which test would be performed .
. . there is a handwritten note stating ‘Blood Drug Screen—Requested
by Officer.’”143 The urine test was conducted not only by Kristy, but
by two out of state labs as well.144 Both out of state companies and the
local hospital produced documents that indicated that Ellis had
methamphetamine in his system.145 Ellis was convicted on all
counts.146
Ellis argued that the admission of the blood/alcohol tests under
the business records exception violated his guarantees under the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.147 The court did not give much
credence to his argument; however, it considered both the business
records issue and the certification issues in turn.148
138

Id.
Id.
140
Id. (it is important to note that Ellis did not object to the authenticity of the
records).
141
Id. at 922.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 924.
148
Id. The court addressed the issue of certification in the final part of its
decision. Certification sets the foundational basis required to show that the evidence
in question is admissible. It must be noted that certification does not determine
139
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The court quickly recognized the “obstacle”149 of the Crawford
Court’s “designation of business records as nontestimonial.”150 The
Court’s overbroad definition is flawed and has caused a lot of
confusion.151 The definition is faulty primarily because “it assumes
that all business records are, by definition, nontestimonial”152 and
secondly, because the courts tend to disregard the “long-held standards
or conditions applicable to defining business records”153 which tends
to make such records testimonial as defined by Crawford.154
One court acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s designation
of business records as nontestimonial was purely dictum and refused
to find it controlling.155 That court dismissed the above designation
because, it argued that not only is it dictum, but it does not properly
acknowledge that “while some evidence may fall within the general
business-record exception, other business records should nonetheless
be subject to a analysis to be excluded from evidence thereunder
because they are in fact testimonial.”156 The Seventh Circuit preferred
to take the literal, blanket approach, instead of a case-by-case analysis
to resolving whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights have been
violated.157 While this approach may not necessarily conflict with the
underlying purpose of the Confrontation Clause supra, it does seem to
conflict with the current developments in the law of the Confrontation
Clause.

whether confrontation concerns will be raised; however, it helps lay the proper
foundation that will in turn determine whether the evidence is admissible.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
See supra note 86.
152
Yermish, supra note 27, at 13.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 13 n.23 (quoting State v. Crager, 844 N.E.2d 390, 397 (Ohio Ct. App.
2005)).
156
Yermish, supra note 27, at 13 (quoting Crager, 844 N.E.2d at 397).
157
See United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 2006).
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B. The Business Records Exception as Applied in Ellis
Ellis “attack[ed] the underlying medical records by arguing
that they were created not because of routine medical procedures, but
because of government investigation.”158 The court then makes an
argument that they in essence seem to totally disregard. It noted that
“the records used against Ellis . . . might be considered testimonial
because they were created under police supervision and during an
investigation for the purpose of determining whether a crime had been
committed.”159 Without really explaining why it dismissed this
seemingly viable argument, the court continued its discussion by
indicating that “whether a statement was made with an eye toward
prosecution, that is, with the knowledge or for the purpose that it
would be user for later prosecution” is important when designating
between testimonial and non testimonial statements.160 It found
support for these statements and for the definitions of “testimonial” in
the First,161 Second,162 Third,163 and Sixth Circuits.164 The court even
noted that in the past it had rejected arguments made under Crawford
because the statements were “not [considered] testimonial because

158

Id. at 924.
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 924 (citing United States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 2006)
(holding a statement to be testimonial because “it [was] clear that an objectively
reasonable person in [the declarant’s] shoes would understand that the statement
would be used in prosecuting [the defendant] at trial”)).
162
Ellis, 460 F.3d at 924 (citing United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir.
2004)).
163
Ellis, 460 F.3d at 924 (citing United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355 (3d Cir.
2005) (noting that statements are testimonial when “made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at later trial”) (citations and quotations omitted)).
164
Ellis, 460 F.3d at 924 (citing United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662 (6th
Cir. 2004) (noting that a statement is testimonial when “a reasonable person in the
declarant’s position would anticipate his statement being used against the accused in
investigating and prosecuting a crime”)).
159
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they were not made with the respective declarants having an eye
towards criminal prosecution.”165
In 2004 the Second Circuit decided United States v. Saget.166
Saget was indicted for firearms trafficking, conspiring to traffic
firearms, and for making false statements in connection to the
trafficking of firearms.167 Saget’s co-conspirator was a man named
Beckham.168 Beckham engaged in several conversations with a person
he later came to find out was a confidential informant.169 These
conversations were tape recorded without Beckham’s knowledge.170
At Saget’s trial, Beckham was not available to testify, and the
state sought to admit the taped conversations under the 804(b)(3)
hearsay exceptions.171 Because Crawford had not yet been decided,
the trial court concluded that “the admission of the statements as
substantive evidence of Saget’s participation in the conspiracy did not
violate the Confrontation Clause because the statements bore
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness required under Ohio v.
Roberts.”172 However, before oral arguments were heard, the Supreme
Court decided Crawford v. Washington, which dramatically changed
the legal landscape.173
On appeal, the Second Circuit stated that “Crawford at least
suggests that the determinative factor in determining whether a
165

Ellis, 460 F.3d at 925 (quoting United States v. Gilbertson, 435 F.3d 790,
795-96 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7
(2004))).
166
377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004).
167
Id. at 225.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id. Rule 803(b)(3) speaks to the hearsay exception relating to statements
made against penal interest.
172
Saget, 377 F.3d at 225.
173
Id. at 226. Crawford, discussed passim, held that no prior testimonial
statement made by a declarant who does not testify at the trial may be admitted
against a defendant unless the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him or her.
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declarant bears testimony is the declarant’s awareness that his or her
statement may later be used at trial.”174 It further intimated that the
examples presented in Crawford “provide that the statement must be
such that the declarant reasonably expects that the statement might be
used in future judicial proceedings.”175 While the Supreme Court did
not expressly adopt any particular or express definition, because they
all share a common nucleus, the Second Circuit argued that the
Supreme Court would probably agree to use the “reasonable
expectation of the declarant as the anchor of a more concrete
definition of testimony.”176 Thus, a more narrow definition of
testimonial began to emerge.
The Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hinton177
echoes the Second Circuit’s ruling in Saget.178 The court began its
opinion by reciting the changes in the law post Crawford and
continued by stating that “where an objective witness reasonably
anticipates that a given statement will be used at a later trial, that
statement is likely testimony in the sense that it is offered to establish
or prove a fact.”179
Hinton had appealed his conviction for possession with intent
to distribute cocaine.180 The main issue, as with the other relevant
cases, is whether the evidence being sought to be admitted was
testimonial in nature, and thus, subject to the Confrontation Clause.181
However, the key question is what is the definition of testimonial?
This court derived its definition of testimonial from the
Supreme Court’s use of the word witness.182 “The term ‘witnesses’ . . .
embraces all those who ‘bear testimony,’ whether at trial or outside the
174

Id. at 228.
Id.
176
Id.
177
United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2005).
178
See Saget, 377 F.3d 223.
179
Hinton, 423 F.3d at 355, 357-59.
180
Id. at 356.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 358.
175
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courtroom.”183 Thus, it settled on the language that implies that
“testimony” is “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”184 Once the court
reached the conclusion supra, it acknowledged what the Court in
Crawford stated as one of its formulation for defining testimonial:
“statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at later trial.”185 To further support its conclusion, the
Third Circuit again cited to the Supreme Court’s language in
Crawford: “where an objective witness reasonably anticipates that a
given statement will be used at a later trial, that statement is likely
testimony in the sense that it is offered to establish or prove a fact. As
such, absent unavailability and a prior opportunity for crossexamination, it must be subjected to the strictures of the Confrontation
Clause.”186
Moreover, the Third Circuit, through the Supreme Court’s very
language, supports the Second Circuit’s conclusion that when a
witness can anticipate that the statement he or she is making could be
used at trial, the only way to avoid Sixth Amendment issues is to allow
the witness to testify and to be cross-examined by the defendant.187
The Third Circuit’s definition was supported again with the
First Circuit’s July of 2006 decision, United States v. Maher.188 Maher
dealt with “the admission of [a] non-testifying informants’ out-ofcourt statements through the testimony of police officers.”189 Because
this case was heard after Crawford was decided, the controlling law
dictated that a testimonial out-of-court statement is inadmissible unless
“(1) the declarant testifies, or (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity
for cross-examination and the declarant is unavailable, or (3) the
183

Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)).
Hinton, 423 F.3d at 355, 358 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51).
185
Hinton, 423 F.3d at 355, 358
186
Id. at 360 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 68).
187
See generally Hinton, 423 F.3d at 355.
188
454 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2006).
189
Id. at 19.
184
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evidence is admitted for purposes other than establishing the truth of
the matter asserted.”190
Since the Crawford decision did not specifically define
testimonial, it has been up to the courts to narrow the scope of the
definition.191 The Maher court acknowledged that in “applying
Crawford, . . . a statement is testimonial if a reasonable declarant,
similarly situated, would have the capacity to appreciate that the
statement is of a sort typically preserve[d] . . . for . . . potential
prosecutorial use.”192 In this case, the police officer’s testimony about
what he learned from a third party falls within the definition of
testimonial because it is similar, if not identical, to one of the
examples193 given by the Crawford court of a testimonial statement.194
Other evidence indicated that the statement should be
considered testimonial: it should be testimonial because the police
officer and the informant made a cooperation agreement which
strongly indicates that the statement would be used prosecutorially.195
Thus, this case supports the proposition that if a declarant is available
to testify, and the statement fits the definition of testimonial supra,
then the Confrontation Clause will be violated if the declarant does not
testify in open court.196

190

Id. at 19-20 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54, 59 n.9 (Rehnquist, J.
concurring)).
191
See United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004); Hinton, 423 F.3d
355; Maher, 454 F.3d 13.
192
Maher, 454 F.3d at 19 (citing United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 60-61
(1st Cir. 2005) (holding that 911 calls may be testimonial in certain circumstances)
(internal quotations omitted)).
193
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (stating various formulations of this core class of
“testimonial” statements exist: “material such as affidavits [and] custodial
examinations”).
194
Maher, 454 F.3d at 19.
195
Id. at 21.
196
Id.
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The cases supra primarily involve situations where a police
officer is testifying on what he heard from an informant.197 Although
this is not the exact same situation in Ellis, the underlying concern is
the same: an out-of-court statement made by a witness that can
reasonably anticipate that his or her statement could be used
prosecutorially needs to be available to testify as to his or her
declaration or risk violating the defendant’s constitutional rights.198
The Seventh Circuit cited these cases and acknowledged what each
one held.199
The Ellis court continued to move in the direction of finding a
violation of the Confrontation Clause and cited to the cases discussed
supra as well as pointing out that “Ellis . . . appear[s] to be on strong
ground in arguing that the results of his medical tests were
testimonial” because “[i]t must have been obvious to Kristy200 . . . that
her results might end up as evidence against Ellis in some kind of
trial.”201 Besides it allegedly being obvious to Kristy that the test
results may be used at trial, the court cited further circumstances that
would lend a reasonable witness to conclude that the statement could
be used prosecutorially.202 A police officer not only escorted Ellis to
the hospital, but he also watched as the tests were performed.203 The
lab charts clearly indicated that the reason for the test was
“Reasonable Suspicion/Cause” and that they were “Requested by
Officer.”204 Unlike the complete lack of evidence in Stave v. Davis,205
197

See Hinton, United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 355 (3d Cir. 2005);
Maher, 454 F.3d at 13.
198
See generally Crawford, 541 U.S. 36; United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223
(2d Cir. 2004); Hinton, 423 F.3d at 355; Maher, 454 F.3d at 13.
199
United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 925 (7th Cir. 2006).
200
Kristy is the laboratory technician who performed the tests on Mr. Ellis.
201
Id. at 924.
202
Id. at 921-22.
203
Id.
204
Id. at 924.
205
State v. Davis (“Davis I”), 111 P.3d 844, 850 (Wash. 2005) (stating that
there was no evidence whatsoever that McCottry knew or should have known that
her statements would be used at trial when she made the call to 911).
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supra, the court pointed to ample evidence that indicated that Kristy,
the lab technician, should have known that these lab exams and the
results were “pretrial statements that . . . would reasonably [be]
expect[ed] to be used prosecutorially,”206 or “statements that were
made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a
later trial.”207 Applying this objective, reasonable witness standard,
one would think the court would have concluded that the laboratory
records were testimonial, however the court chose to go in a different
direction than the cases supra208 and did just the opposite.209
One small “nevertheless” later and the court dismissed its
previous four paragraphs worth of arguments210 that are consistent
with Crawford.211 The reason behind its decision was eloquently put:
the court “d[id] not think th[o]se circumstances transform[ed] what
[wa]s otherwise a nontestimonial business record into a testimonial
statement implicating the Confrontation Clause.”212 This succinctly
put statement begs one particular question: what rises to the level of
implicating the Confrontation Clause? Intriguingly, the court does not
proffer any support for its one-sentence assertion supra, and it cites
206

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (citing White v. Illinois,
502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) and Br. for National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Pet’r at 3).
207
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)
and Br. for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Pet’r at 3).
208
See Ellis, 460 F.3d at 924.
209
Id. at 924-26.
210
Id. In United States v. Ellis, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
devotes at least four full paragraphs to arguments that would logically support a
conclusion that Kristy should have known that the statements would be used for later
trial. Thus, under the third formulation of Crawford, her acts would be considered
testimonial, and therefore only admissible as evidence if the declarant is available to
testify and the defendant had a chance to cross-examine the declarant. However, as
noted in the article supra, the court rejects its own conclusions without much
support.
211
Id.
212
Id. at 925.
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only two cases213 infra for substantiation of its highly subjective
conclusion.214
The court may have been correct in its determination if Roberts
was still the controlling law;215 however the court seems to disregard
the recent change in the law under the Crawford rule that the court
clearly acknowledges exists.216 In an effort to understand why the
Seventh Circuit came to this conclusion, it leads to the question: How
are other courts handling similar issues?
VII. OTHER COURT’S APPLICATIONS OF THE
BUSINESS-RECORDS EXCEPTION AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Recent state court decisions have grappled with issues that are
similar to Ellis and have ruled contrary to the Seventh Circuit.217 The
following will discuss the cases, state what they concluded, and
attempt to explain why they ruled differently than the Seventh Circuit.
Of course, these decision are not binding precedent, however, they
may shed some light on why the Seventh Circuit’s argument is flawed.
A. Rivera v. Florida
In September of 2005, the District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Fifth District heard the case of Rivera v. Florida.218 Salvador Rivera
213

For support, the Seventh Circuit cites to: United States v. Cervantes-Flores,
421 F.3d 825, 833 (9th Cir. 2005) and United States v. Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d 678,
680 (5th Cir. 2005) both holding that certificates of non-existence of records are
nontestimonial and thus their admission does not violate the Confrontation Clause.
214
Ellis, 460 F.3d at 924-26.
215
Under Roberts, a judge is afforded much more discretion because the test
allows otherwise inadmissible hearsay in if it falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception or if the court deems the statement to be reliable.
216
Ellis, 460 F.3d at 924-26.
217
See, e.g., Martin v. Florida, 936 So.2d 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
(Thomas, J. dissenting); Rivera v. Florida, 917 So.2d 210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005);
New Jersey v. Renshaw, 915 A.2d 1081 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007)
218
Rivera, 917 So. 2d 210.
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had been on trial for allegedly trafficking cocaine.219 He appealed the
lower court’s decision by arguing that “the court erred in introducing a
Florida Department of Law Enforcement (“FDLE”) lab report through
the records custodian and in limiting his right to cross-examine the
confidential informant involved in his case.”220 In this case, the State
tried to introduce the lab reports through the testimony of one Amanda
Julian, the supervisor of the chemist who conducted the lab test.221 The
lower court overruled Rivera’s hearsay objection and the District
Court of Appeal of Florida reversed, concluding that the admission of
the lab report without the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant
was in error.222
The court’s main argument revolved around the concern that it
“is Rivera’s constitutional right to confront his accusers in a criminal
trial.”223 The court recognized that lab “tests performed in the usual
course of hospital business are admissible in criminal cases under the
business records exception” because they are inherently trustworthy.224
If the reports are reliable enough for medical purposes, then they
should be reliable enough for trial.225 However, it failed to extend this
exception to the FDLE lab report because allowing the record into
evidence without the opportunity for cross-examination would
“threaten Rivera’s right under the Confrontation Clause to question the
witness to ensure a fair trial.”226 By cross-examining the declarant, the
defense could have questioned him or her about “chain of custody,
methods of scientific testing, and analytical procedures regarding” the
reports at issue.227 The court succinctly concluded its argument by
219

Id. at 211.
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id. at 212.
225
Id. (citing Baber v. State, 775 So.2d 258, 260-61 (Fla. 2000), cert. denied,
532 U.S. 1022 (2001)).
226
Rivera, 917 So.2d at 212.
227
Id.
220
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persuasively stating that: “[T]he chemist’s report lacks the indicia of
reliability characteristic of hospital record cases. The hospital tests a
patient’s blood alcohol for the benefit of the patient’s treatment; in
contrast, the State tests alleged drug samples to incriminate and
convict the accused.”228
This language plainly sets forth a logical way of looking at the
intersection between the Confrontation Clause and the business
records exception to the hearsay rule.229 If lab records or similar
documents are being used to incriminate and convict an accused, then
the accused should retain his Sixth Amendment right to confront his
accuser.230 Otherwise, accusers may attempt to thwart the Constitution
by allowing “the State to sidestep . . . prov[ing] the elements of the
charged offense.”231 It is especially important when the evidence being
sought to be admitted is crucial to the State’s case.
A second Florida state court case echoes the decision made in
Rivera, supra.
B. Martin v. Florida
The facts in Martin v. Florida closely mirror those of Rivera.
The defendant had been on trial for possession of cocaine and
cannabis and was appealing those convictions.232 The State also
attempted to admit an FDLE report to show that the “substances seized
from Martin were contraband.”233 Martin objected to the admission of
the FDLE report and the lower court overruled the objection.234 The
Court of Appeal reversed holding that “admission of the FDLE report
as a business record without giving appellant the right to examine the
228

Id.
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Martin v. Florida, 936 So. 2d 1190, 1191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
(Thomas, J. dissenting).
233
Id.
234
Id.
229
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author of the report was reversible error”235 because under Crawford,
“the admission of hearsay evidence which was ‘testimonial’ in nature
violates the Confrontation Clause unless the declarant is unavailable to
testify and unless the defendant had a prior meaningful opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant.”236 The court recognized that Crawford
did not define testimonial and that the Court noted that business
records are by their nature nontestimonial. However, the Court of
Appeal did not get bogged down by Crawford’s dicta and, unlike the
Seventh Circuit, focused on the language that implied that testimonial
statements were those statements that a witness “reasonably expect[]
to be used prosecutorially”237 or which “would be available for use at
later trial.”238
The court continued its discussion by admitting that the FDLE
report “may meet the definition of a business record,”239 however,
because it was prepared in anticipation of litigation, it should not have
been admitted without the opportunity for cross-examination.240 “The
testing memorialized in the report was occasioned solely by the arrest
of the appellant and was performed by a state law enforcement agency,
and the report was offered by the State in furtherance of a criminal
prosecution.”241 This statement could easily be taken out of the instant
case and transplanted into the Ellis opinion in order to support the
conclusion that the blood and alcohol lab reports were, in fact,
testimonial in nature.
The dissent in this case disagreed with the majority’s decision
and cited a series of cases for support.242 Moreover, the dissent, much
235

Id. at 1192.
Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004)).
237
Martin, 936 So. 2d at 1192 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55).
238
Martin, 936 So. 2d at 1192
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
Id.; see also People v. Johnson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(laboratory reports routine and nontestimonial documents); Commonwealth v.
Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701 (Mass. 2005) (laboratory report on weight of cocaine a
236
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like the Seventh Circuit, focused on the conclusion in dicta that
business records are a likely example of a nontestimonial statement.243
Its argument continued by refuting the majority’s argument that the
FDLE report was created solely to convict the accused, and thus was
testimonial, by stating that “an FDLE record is not always intended to
bear witness against the accused, because it could also be used to
exonerate the accused.”244 However, it stands to reason that if the
defense were to introduce this evidence as conclusory, the State may
want to argue that without an opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant, the lab report, created in anticipation of litigation and being
used to exonerate the accused, could be just as unreliable and
untrustworthy.
The dissent concluded that the lab report met the definition of a
business record as defined in the Florida Statute and it declined the
majority’s in anticipation of litigation argument.245 “FDLE has no
motive to fabricate its reports and has no financial interest at stake.
Further, FDLE will not suffer adverse consequences if its scientists
report that a tested substance is not contraband.”246 It summed up its
arguments by stating that FDLE lab reports are not produced by law
enforcements officers in adversarial settings, unlike an arresting
officer’s affidavit, and they are “exactly the type of business records
that the legislature intended to authorize as exceptions to the business
rule.”247 While this may be true, it begs the question: Is it fair to infer
that an arresting officer’s affidavit, conducted in the regular course of
his official business, used as evidence to prove or disprove an
accused’s innocence, is so inherently unreliable that it is automatically
subject to confrontation? However, a lab report created by a nongovernmental entity solely to prove or disprove an accused’s alleged
business record); People v. Brown, 801 N.Y.S.2d 709 (N.Y. 2005) (DNA testing
records nontestimonial).
243
Martin, 936 So.2d at 1193.
244
Id. at 1194.
245
Id.
246
Id. at 1195.
247
Id. at 1196.
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crime is not? There are no clear answers to these questions because
even amongst the different state courts, there is a large disagreement
on whether laboratory reports are testimonial or nontestimonial in
nature.248
VIII. DID THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT GET IT RIGHT?
The Seventh Circuit blindly holds on to the Crawford court’s
language (in dictum) that business records are by their very nature,
nontestimonial statements.249 It makes it clear that “[it] do[es] not
think it matters that these observations were made with the knowledge
that they might be used for criminal prosecution.”250 But what about
the three formulations set forth in Crawford of what constitutes a
testimonial statement? The Seventh Circuit acknowledges the
formulations and even comments that “[w]hether a statement was
made with an eye toward prosecution, that is, with the knowledge that
it would be used for later prosecution, is an important aspect of
delineating between testimonial and nontestimonial evidence.”251
Despite this acknowledgement and with very little reasoning and
support, the court disregards the Crawford formulations.252 However,
the court does attempt to provide some support for its seemingly
unreasonable statement by citing two cases, one from the Court of
248

See, e.g., id. (citing People v. Kanhai, 797 N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y. Crum’s.
2005) (breathalyzer test results regular business records); People v. Durio, 794
N.Y.S.2d 863 (N.Y. 2005) (autopsy reports business records); but cf. Belvin v. State,
922 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a breath-test affidavit was
testimonial hearsay and not admissible as a business record because the affidavit was
prepared in anticipation of litigation)).
249
United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 925 (7th Cir. 2006);
250
Id.
251
Id. at 924 (emphasis added).
252
Id. The court also declares that the records used against Ellis may be
considered testimonial in nature because “they were created under police supervision
and during an investigation for the purpose of determining whether a crime had been
committed.” This is a crucial argument that the court simply disregards without
explanation.
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit253 and one from the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit.254
The facts presented in both of these cases are very similar, and
thus, are considered together. The plaintiffs in both these cases were
immigrants who were subsequently caught in the United States
without the proper authorization to remain in the country.255 Each
plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the government alleging that the
admission of the certificates of non-existence of records (“CNR”),
without the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, violated their
Sixth Amendment rights.256 Both of these cases held that CNRs “were
nontestimonial despite the fact that they were prepared by the
government in anticipation of criminal prosecution” because the
creation of the documents was “routine” and too dissimilar from the
“examples of testimonial evidence provided by Crawford.”257
This line of reasoning is faulty, and these courts erred in a
similar manner as the Seventh Circuit did in Ellis. Specifically, all
three courts disregarded the definitions set forth in the three Crawford
formulations, supra, and single-mindedly held on to the “nonexhaustive” list of examples of testimonial statements.258 The three
courts used a strict, literal approach to their arguments by reading only
the black letters written on the page and ignoring the spirit of the
Confrontation Clause and of the Supreme Court’s decision.
Justice Scalia stated in Davis v. Washington that “[o]ur opinion
in Crawford set forth various formulations of the core class of
testimonial statements . . . but found it unnecessary to enforce any of
them, because some statements qualify under any definition.”259 It is
hard to believe that the Seventh Circuit would strictly adhere to one
253

United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d 678, 680 (5th Cir. 2005).
255
Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d at 828; Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d at 680.
256
Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d at 828; Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d at 680.
257
Ellis, 460 F.3d at 925-26 (internal quotations omitted).
258
Id.
259
Davis v. Washington (“Davis II”), 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273 (2006) (internal
quotations omitted).
254
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example stated in dictum of what testimonial is not, disregard the spirit
behind the generalizations made in the non-exhaustive list of core
class of testimonial statements, and ignore the formulations that were
stated in Crawford,260reiterated in Davis I261 and Davis II.262
Ellis dealt with laboratory records of blood and alcohol tests.263
It was argued that the only reason for the existence of the records was
for use at trial to prove that a crime had occurred.264 Similarly, in
Cervantes-Flores and Rueda-Rivera, the defense also argued that the
only reason for the existence of the records was the immigration
proceeding, and thus, the records should not be ordinary business
records.265 Despite the parallel arguments, the two records are very
dissimilar.
Ordinary laboratory records are created when a patient
voluntarily seeks medical attention at a hospital or a laboratory. The
documents are prepared in a routine manner on a daily basis. They are
not prepared with an eye towards prosecution or in anticipation of
litigation. Thus, they are inherently trustworthy and can be admitted at
trial under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.
260

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (Using formulations two
and three to define what testimonial statements are: Pretrial statements that a
declarant would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially and statements made
under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that
the statement would be available for later use at trial).
261
State v. Davis, (“Davis I”), 111 P.3d 844, 853 (Wash. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 668, 675 (6th Cir. 2004) (Using the following to
help narrow the incomplete definition of testimonial: A statement made by a
declarant who seeks to bear witness against the accused determined by querying
whether a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would anticipate his
statement being used against the accused in investigating and prosecuting the crime).
262
Davis II, 126 S.Ct. at 2273 (Using the following to help define testimonial:
“They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution”).
263
See Ellis, 460 F.3d 920.
264
Id. at 924.
265
See United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2005).
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The laboratory test conducted in Ellis was prepared solely for
use at trial, at the request of an officer (not the patient), and is a perfect
example of exactly what the Sixth Amendment was created to protect.
It is not an ordinary business record because the document is serving
as a “witness” that a crime occurred, thus falling squarely within the
definitional of testimonial as set forth in Crawford.266 Therefore, the
record should not have been admitted into evidence unless the
defendant had a chance to meaningfully cross-examine the declarant267
as to the method and manner of preparing and maintaining the
document in question.
In contrast, the CNR can be seen as an ordinary business
record. A CNR is routinely created to prove the absence of a
document.268 A CNR can be made at the request of an immigration
officer or a party to a lawsuit.269 In contrast to the two different ways
that a laboratory record can come to exist, it appears that a CNR only
exists for one purpose: to prove, at a proceeding, whether a certain
document exists. Thus, it can be argued that the record is prepared in
the same manner and for the same reason every time it is requested
making the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on the two CNR cases for
support misplaced.
The Seventh Circuit continues to puzzle its audience by citing
to it own decision, United States v. Gilbertson.270 The court, in an
opinion also authored by Judge Kanne, declared that odometer
statements were not testimonial in nature because they were not made
with an eye towards criminal prosecution.271 It continued its discussion
by stating that the declarations were not initiated by the government,
nor made with the hope that they would later be used at trial against
any defendant.272 In addition, each statement in question was made
266

See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Id. at 68.
268
See Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d at 831 n.2.
269
Id.
270
435 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2006).
271
Id. at 796.
272
Id.
267
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prior to a defendant’s involvement in any crime.273 Thus, the court’s
conclusion seems to flow logically from its reasoning. Unfortunately,
this decision only serves to highlight the objectively unreasonable
conclusion in Ellis.
The Ellis court cites the Gilbertson holding in its discussion of
all the evidence that supports the conclusion that “Ellis may . . . be on
strong ground in arguing that the results of his medical tests were
testimonial.”274 This can be found in those four paragraphs, supra, that
argue the reasons why the laboratory test results should be testimonial
in nature.275 Gilbertson’s logic, when applied to Ellis, supports the
conclusion that a statement is testimonial in nature, despite being
labeled as a business record, if it is made with an eye towards criminal
prosecution. Although the cases are factually different, the underlying
premise is the same: when a document is prepared with an eye toward
prosecution, it should be deemed testimonial, and thus afforded the
protections of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.
In light of the conclusions reached in Gilbertson, it is very
difficult to comprehend, let alone reconcile, how the same court came
to the opposite conclusion in Ellis. Unfortunately, an analysis of other
decisions in other courts does little to clarify why the Seventh Circuit
ruled as it did.
IX. WHERE IS THE POLICY?
Public policy helps bolster legal conclusions by putting them in
the context of the impact on society. Unfortunately, the Seventh
Circuit does not use any public policy arguments to support its
seemingly arbitrary conclusion in Ellis. Perhaps the court should have
inserted some well thought out policy arguments to support its
conclusion.
It is a well-known fact that dockets are over-crowded and
state’s attorneys, public defenders and trial attorneys are
273

Id.
United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 924 (7th Cir. 2006).
275
Id. (see also note 206, supra).
274
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overworked.276 By limiting the number of witnesses a party is required
to present at trial, the average length of a trial can be shortened.
Safeguards exist in order to ensure that parties receive their Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial. One such safeguard is the
exceptions to the hearsay rule (discussed supra). When the foundation
is laid properly, statements that fall under these exceptions have
historically been deemed reliable and trustworthy and thus are
admissible in court without lengthy presentations about where the
statements came from or how they were made.277 Imagine a trial where
every receipt, record, memoranda and document had to be presented in
court by each and every declarant. Then, imagine sitting through each
and every direct and cross-examination. This scenario would certainly
make for lengthy, tedious trials and the core mission of the fact-finder
would be endlessly delayed in a needless procedural quagmire. Policy
suggests that in order for the public to benefit from fair and just trials,
certain reasonable concessions must exist. Restricting the types of
witnesses that are required to testify at trial is one such concession.
Ensuring the right of justice for all the parties involved is
crucial. One such element of ensuring justice is monitoring the
constitutional rights of all the parties involved. Courts should not be
allowed to simply have a blanket “hearsay exception” approach for
situations such as Ellis, Martin, and Davis without considering the
individual facts of the case. For example, laboratories have produced
what are known as “false positive” results in the past.278 A “false
positive” is “[a] result that is erroneously positive when a situation is
normal.”279 When conducted again, the same test can provide a
different result. A criminal defendant should be allowed to crossexamine a declarant who has created a document, memoranda or other
276

See, e.g., Alison Retka, A typical week with Missouri Attorney Jasman Lutz,
MISSOURI LAWYERS WEEKLY, April 23, 2007; Jerry Crimmins, On defense: Crimes
that fiction wouldn't touch, CHICAGO DAILY LAW BULLETIN, March 27, 2007.
277
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
278
See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); Green v. Bd. Of County
Comm’rs, 472 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing Inc., 473 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2006).
279
WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD MEDICAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2003).
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such statement that will be used at trial as evidence against the
defendant. A blanket approach does not seem fair, much less
constitutional, when it comes to the rights of criminal defendants. The
public would not benefit from such an approach and the courts should
be weary about attempting to implement one.
There will be certain occasions when it will be appropriate to
use one of the many hearsay exceptions to offer a statement into
evidence without presenting the witness. That is exactly why the
hearsay exceptions exist. However, in certain situations (such as when
a statement is prepared in anticipation of litigation) courts should
make case-by-case, factual determinations on whether the specific
situation warrants a blanket hearsay exception approach, or if the
situation mandates closer scrutiny. The Confrontation Clause exists for
many reasons, including protecting a criminal defendant’s right to
confronting any and all hostile witnesses against him. In these
situations, and with the high stakes of a criminal prosecution, one or
two extra witnesses seem worth the time spent, especially if it means
protecting a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights. The integrity of
the system demands it.
X. PROPOSED NEW RULE
Courts should attempt to create one uniform way of classifying
and dealing with business records that are made in anticipation of
litigation. There are many benefits to have one uniform rule:
consistency in application, a bright line rule for potential litigants to
follow, as well as ease in applying and understanding the rule.
In order to classify this hybrid type of business records, courts
should look to formulations two and three of the Crawford decision.280
Such hybrid statements can include, but are not limited to: (1)
280

See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Formulation two states
that testimonial statements are those pretrial statements that declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially and formulation three declares that
testimonial means statements that were made under circumstances which would lead
an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for
later use at trial).
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laboratory records made solely in anticipation of litigation;281 (2)
records created to solely prove that a crime was committed;282 (3)
records that would otherwise be ordinary business records but were
created solely with an eye towards prosecution.
Thus, a new rule is proposed: if a document is prepared in
anticipation of litigation (meaning it fits within one of the two
formulations supra), then the document should be considered
testimonial, and thus afforded the protections of the Confrontation
Clause.283 This is so because it is extremely important to err on the
side of protecting constitutional rights and not on the side of
abrogating them.
CONCLUSION
The definition of testimonial has definitely evolved since
Crawford was decided in 2004.284 The courts have grappled with its
meaning and attempted to narrow the scope of the definition. It has
become clear that statements that are made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness to reasonably believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later criminal trial should
only be admissible if the declarant is available to testify and there has
been an opportunity to cross-examine him or her. However, as this
Note has shown, confusion still exists as to how to classify business
records that were created in anticipation of litigation. The proposed
281

See United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 2006).
See Martin v. Florida, 936 So.2d 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Rivera v.
Florida, 917 So.2d 210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
283
The protection of the Confrontation Clause is: ensuring that the defendant
has a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine his accuser.
284
See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Rehnquist, J.
concurring); Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006); United States v. Maher,
454 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004);
United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Rueda-Rivera,
396 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Gilbertson, 435 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2006); State v. Davis, 111 P.3d
844,154 Wn.2d 291 (Wash. 2005).
282
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rule, supra, would provide a workable directive that would help ease
judicial inconsistency and help establish a consistent way to deal with
this hybrid form of business records.
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